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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARQUES ATENE and 
LARRY ATENE 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 930482-CA 
ooOoo 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 78-2A-3(2)(f) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the failure of the Defendants to maintain contact with their attorneys and the 
subsequent withdrawal by their attorneys constitute a waiver of their right to counsel at trial? 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
The trial court's factual findings regarding whether the failure of the Defendants to 
maintain contact with their counsel constitutes a waiver of their right to counsel will not be 
overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Drobel 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 
1991). However a correction of errors standard will be applied to determine whether the 
trial court applied the proper legal standard in reaching its decision regarding self-
representation and the waiver of the right to counsel. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules determinative of or 
pertinent to the issues presented in this appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This appeal is from a judgment and conviction entered against the Defendants for 
their convictions on one count of Aggravated Assault in violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-103. The 
Judgment and Conviction was entered against each Defendant by the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson on May 20, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendants, along with their brother, Ben Atene, were all jointly charged with 
assaulting Barry Madison and inflicting serious bodily injury. All three Defendants were 
represented by court-appointed counsel, Keith Chiara, at the preliminary hearing. Although 
Mr. Chiara acknowledged the possibility of a conflict of interest before the preliminary 
hearing commenced, the committing Magistrate did not ask either Defendant whether they 
believed a conflict of interest existed or whether they waived any objection to the joint 
representation (R. 2-3). Following the preliminary hearing, each Defendant retained private 
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counsel. However, due to a failure to maintain contact with private counsel, all three private 
lawyers were permitted to withdraw (R. 131 (Larry); 133 (Marques)). The record discloses 
that neither of the Defendants were notified that their private counsel intended to withdraw. 
None of the Defendants attended the hearing when permission was granted for the three 
private counsel to withdraw (R. 61 (Larry); 63 (Marques)). 
The Orders permitting withdrawal of counsel were entered on April 10, 1990. The 
trial court also ordered the San Juan County Sheriff to locate each Defendant and serve 
upon him a copy of the Order directing him to obtain substitute counsel and to appear in 
person for trial on April 25, 1990 (R. 131 (Larry); 133 (Marques)). (See Addendum 1). 
Affidavits were filed by the sheriff and two deputy sheriffs indicating that none of the three 
Defendants were located, but that copies of the Court's Order were delivered to three 
acquaintances of the Defendants including one of their distant relatives (R. 63-64 (Larry; 65-
66 (Marques)). The record does not disclose that any of the Defendants received a copy 
of the Court's Order in sufficient time to obtain substitute counsel. 
On the date set for trial, April 25, 1990, all three Defendants appeared in court 
without counsel (R. 78 (Larry); 80 (Marques)). With the prospective jurors waiting, the trial 
court made a record with each Defendant that he had failed to maintain contact with his 
attorney, that the court had granted private counsel leave to withdraw, that it was too late 
to appoint counsel for the Defendants, and that each Defendant "either initially or through 
gross neglect" (R. 14) waived his right to be represented by an attorney (R. 15-24 (Larry); 
R. 10-15 (Marques)). The court did appoint Mr. Keith Chiara to serve in the capacity as 
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standby counsel, to help the Defendants on legal procedure (R. 9, 28). ("I will have Mr. 
Chiara standby on what we call ~ to advise you on legal procedures; but even he is not 
prepared to present any type of defense for you today, and he hasn't had a chance to 
interview any witnesses or anything of that sort. So I can't appoint counsel for you at this 
late date") (R. 8, 28). 
Defendant Marques Atene was 24 at the time of the trial and was a graduate of 
Mountain Valley High School in Monticello. Mr. Atene advised the trial court, HI need [a] 
lawyer, though." at the time that the trial judge made a record that the Defendant had 
waived his right to counsel (R. 12). 
Defendant Larry Atene was 21 at the time of the trial and was a graduate of 
Mountain Valley High School in Monticello. The court reluctantly granted Mr. Atene an 
interpreter. Mr. Atene had no experience in court before this case. He specifically advised 
the trial court, "But this is my first time that I've been [in] court" (R. 17). Between the 
preliminary hearing and the trial, Mr. Atene resided in Phoenix, Arizona. When Mr. Atene 
learned of the court's Order permitting his private counsel to withdraw, he attempted 
through a relative to retain Mr. Chiara to represent him at the trial (R. 27). The contact 
with Mr. Chiara was not made until the day before the trial. Mr. Atene offered to pay Mr. 
Chiara $100.00 to represent him at the trial (R. 25, 26). Mr. Chiara declined the offer. 
The State called 12 witnesses to testify on the first day of trial. The Defendants asked 
the witnesses a few questions. Neither Defendant returned to trial on the second day. The 
trial proceeded in the absence of the Defendants. The jury convicted each Defendant of 
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Aggravated Assault. The Defendants were fugitives until April of 1993. They were 
sentenced on May 20, 1993, to the indeterminate term of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison 
where they are presently serving their sentences. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendants were denied their right to the effective assistance of counsel when 
the trial court interpreted their negligent failure to maintain contact with their attorneys as 
a waiver of that fundamental constitutional right. Moreover, the trial court erred in failing 
to warn the Defendants that their counsel had been permitted to withdraw and in failing to 
explain to the Defendants the disadvantages of self-representation. Accordingly, the 
Defendants' convictions must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLI-
GENTLY WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND CHOOSE 
SELF-REPRESENTATION. 
The Sixth Amendment right to the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense." This right guarantees all criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). The purpose of the right to effective 
assistance of counsel is to insure that criminal defendants receive fair trials. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The right to effective assistance of counsel is "so basic to 
a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Hollowav v. 
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Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)); 
State v. Velarde. 806 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah App. 1991). 
Thus, the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
withhold from criminal courts the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or 
liberty unless he has waived the assistance of counsel. Courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 
1019 (1938). 
In the instant matter, the trial court concluded that the Defendants' failure to 
maintain contact with their private counsel constituted a waiver of their right to counsel. 
The trial court's conclusion in this regard constitutes plain error. Although waiver of the 
right to counsel is possible, it did not happen on the facts of this case. The Defendants do 
not deny they were negligent in failing to maintain contact with their private counsel; this 
negligence, however, does not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to 
counsel. Permitting the private counsel to withdraw in the instant matter may not have been 
an abuse of discretion by the trial court. However, once private counsel were permitted to 
withdraw, it was incumbent upon the trial court to be certain that the Defendants 
understood their responsibility to obtain substitute counsel. Moreover, the trial court should 
have made the Defendants aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 
By proceeding to trial without first taking the time to (a) warn the Defendants that they 
were unrepresented and (b) explain the disadvantages of self-representation, the trial court 
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omitted an essential intermediate step. Notwithstanding their negligence, the Defendants 
deserved the opportunity to obtain substitute counsel. 
The constitutional right of an accused to be present by counsel invokes, of 
itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused - whose life or liberty 
is at stake - is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and 
weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an 
intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive 
the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly 
determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that 
determination to appear upon the record. 
Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. at 1023. 
In State v. Wuffenstein, 733 P.2d 120 (Utah 1986), the defendant rejected the court's 
appointment of the public defender's office at his arraignment and preliminary hearing. The 
defendant claimed they were incompetent and he had no faith in them. When the court 
refused to appoint private counsel, the defendant appeared at the pre-trial proceedings 
without counsel. The trial court warned the defendant this his unjustified, conclusory 
rejection of counsel would be deemed a waiver of his right to a court-appointed attorney. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the defendant waived his right to counsel. In 
contrast, in the instant matter, there was no such warning or opportunity for these 
Defendants to obtain substitute counsel. 
A defendant must have full knowledge and adequate warning concerning his right to 
counsel and a clear intent to relinquish that right to counsel before a waiver can be found. 
The burden is on the State to show that an accused voluntarily and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel. Presuming waiver from a silent record was held impermissible in Brooks 
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v. State, 819 S.W.2d 288 (Ark. App. 1991). In Brooks, the defendant appeared before the 
trial court on an Order to Show Cause to revoke his probation. At the time of the 
defendant's initial appearance before the trial court, he rejected the services of a public 
defender. The trial court advised the defendant to hire a lawyer if he did not want the 
public defender's office representing him. The defendant then appeared on the date set for 
the evidentiary probation revocation hearing without a lawyer. The following colloquy then 
occurred: 
The Court: Are you planning on representing yourself? 
Defendant: I ain't' qualified to represent myself. I need an 
attorney . . . 
The Court: And I have given him two months to get a lawyer . 
Defendant: I ain't got none. 
The Court: That's your fault. I told you you would either have 
to represent yourself or get your own lawyer because you fired 
Ms. Brasey, and that was the end of that. We are not going to 
appoint every lawyer in the United States for you. 
Defendant: I don't want her. 
The hearing was then held and the defendant's probation was revoked. On appeal, 
the Court rejected the State's argument that the defendant had manipulated the judicial 
process and thereby forfeited his right to counsel. The Court stated: "Here, there is no 
indication on the record presented to us of any request by Appellant that he be allowed to 
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represent himself. To the contrary, Appellant requested that he have counsel and averred 
that he was not qualified to defend himself." Id. at 290. 
The deprivation of the right to counsel is more egregious in the instant matter. In 
Brooks v. State and State v. Wuffenstein, supra, both defendants rejected court-appointed 
counsel, but were at least advised of their responsibility to retain substitute counsel. That 
never happened in the instant case. Instead, the record discloses that Larry Atene only 
learned he was unrepresented the day before the trial and Marques Atene only learned he 
was unrepresented on the morning of the trial. 
In State v. Hamilton. 732 P.2d 505 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court considered 
whether a defendant had waived his right to counsel when the defendant refused to be 
represented by an attorney, insisting instead upon representation by a lay spokesman. 
Although the defendant was warned by the trial court that he should have an attorney help 
him solve his legal problems, the defendant eschewed this advice. The Court concluded: 
However a defendant may waive that right and represent himself 
provided that he has knowingly and intelligently waived that right. 
In order to competently and intelligently choose self-representa-
tion, a defendant should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will 
establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open." (citations omitted). 
Waiver may not be presumed from a silent record. "The record must show, or there 
must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but 
intelligently and understandably rejected that offer. Anything less is not waiver." Carnley 
v. Cochran. 369 U.S. 506 (1962). Notwithstanding their negligence, these Defendants were 
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constitutionally entitled to notice and a warning before the trial court deemed that they 
waived their right to counsel. 
Self-representation cases illustrate the necessity for criminal defendants to knowingly 
and intelligently waive their right to counsel. Waivers are never presumed in these cases. 
Instead, whenever a defendant attempts to exercise his right to represent himself, the trial 
court has the following obligations: (1) to inform the defendant of the benefits he would 
relinquish and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation; (2) if the defendant still 
insists upon self-representation, then the court must determined that the defendant has made 
his choice voluntarily and intelligently; and (3) even if it is established that the defendant has 
voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, the court must still determine 
whether unusual circumstances exist which would preclude the defendant from exercising his 
right to represent himself. In this regard, the court must still determine whether an accused, 
by reason of his age, mental capacity, lack of knowledge, lack of experience, or inexperience 
in criminal proceedings would be deprived of a fair trial if permitted to conduct his own 
defense. State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Bakolov, 209 Adv. Rep. 22; 
Williams v. State. 427 So.2d 768 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1983); Bell v. State, 734 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 
App. - Austin 1987). No such determination was made in the matter in spite of Mr. Larry 
Atene's clear statement to the trial judge that he was unfamiliar with court and Mr. Marques 
Atene's specific request for counsel. 
People v. Sawyer. 455 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1982), is illustrative of the burden 
imposed upon the trial court before an accused is permitted to waive his right to counsel. 
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In Sawyer, the defendant refused to accept the assistance of counsel from the Public 
Defender's office but did not affirmatively choose to proceed pro se and, in fact, told the 
court, "I am not competent to defend myself." Id. at 240. Nonetheless, the defendant was 
tried and convicted without the assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals of New York 
reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial court failed to make a "'searching 
inquiry' of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the 'dangers and disadvantages' of 
giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant." Id. at 
423 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835). The Court went on to say that the 
right to proceed pro se should not be afforded merely upon a defendant's unequivocal and 
timely assertion of the right; that assertion must be accompanied by a "knowing and 
intelligent" waiver of the right to counsel. Id. Finally, the court noted that "appropriate 
'colloquy on the record between the judge and defendant' will not only test the defendant's 
understanding, but provide an objective basis for review." Id. (quoting U.S. v. Bailey, 675 
F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). In the instant case, just as in Sawyer, "the precautionary inquiry 
in this case was woefully inadequate" and "did not satisfy the duty to make a 'searching 
inquiry.'" Id. 
CONCLUSION 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend. 6. The Defendants were deprived 
of this fundamental right in the instant case. The trial court erred in refusing to allow the 
Defendants to obtain substitute counsel after their counsel had withdrawn. Additionally, the 
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trial court neglected its duty to conduct a "searching inquiry" into whether the Defendants 
"knowingly and intelligently" waived their right to counsel. For all of the foregoing reasons, 
the Defendants' convictions must be reversed. 
DATED this J-Q day of September, 1993. 
AppeUaiits 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, 
Attorney for Defendants/. 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW 
vs. * 
MARCUS JIM ATENE, * Criminal No. 78JL 
Defendant. * 
The Attorney for the above named defendant appeared before 
the Court on this date and filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel 
on the ground that he had been unable to locate the defendant and 
was unable to prepare for trial. 
The Court hereby grants the motion and orders that counsel 
be allowed to withdraw. The Court further orders that the trial 
proceed as set April 25th, 1990 at 9:30 a.m. and that the Defendant 
appear in person at that time with new counsel if the Defendant 
wishes to be represented by an attorney. 
The Court further orders that a copy of this order be served 
personally upon the defendant by the Sheriff of San Juan County or 
his deputy forthwith. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 1990. 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW 
vs. * 
LARRY ATENE, * Criminal No. 7 83 
Defendant. * 
The Attorney for the above named defendant appeared before 
the Court on this date and filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel 
on the ground that he had been unable to locate the defendant and 
was unable to prepare for trial. 
The Court hereby grants the motion and orders that counsel 
be allowed to withdraw. The Court further orders that the trial 
proceed as set April 25th, 1990 at 9:30 a.m. and that the Defendant 
appear in person at that time with new counsel if the Defendant 
wishes to be represented by an attorney. 
The Court further orders that a copy of this order be served 
personally upon the defendant by the Sheriff of San Juan County or 
his deputy forthwith. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 1990. 
